Imagine pouring billions of dollars and years of effort into a shiny new warship program, only to wake up one morning and decide it just isn’t worth finishing. That’s exactly what happened last week when the Secretary of the Navy dropped a bombshell that has defense watchers across Washington scratching their heads.
In a short video message that felt more like a corporate earnings apology than a Pentagon announcement, the Navy confirmed it is canceling the bulk of the Constellation-class guided-missile frigate program. Yes, you read that right—the service is walking away from a project that was supposed to deliver twenty modern warships to help close the yawning gap with China’s rapidly expanding fleet.
It’s the kind of decision that doesn’t happen in a vacuum. When a military branch kills a major platform this late in the game, something has gone seriously wrong behind the scenes. And honestly? The writing has been on the wall for months, if not years.
A Program That Promised Much but Delivered Headaches
Let’s rewind a bit. Back in 2020, there was genuine excitement when the Navy awarded the contract to build the new frigates to a shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin. The Constellation-class was pitched as the Goldilocks solution—bigger and more capable than the troubled Littoral Combat Ships, but smaller and cheaper than the workhorse Arleigh Burke destroyers.
The design was supposed to be mature. After all, it was based on a European frigate that was already sailing the Mediterranean. How hard could it be to Americanize it a little and start cranking out ships?
As it turns out, really hard.
From European Parent to Franken-Ship
One of the biggest selling points was that the Constellation would share about 85% of its design with an existing European frigate. That commonality was supposed to keep costs down and schedules tight.
But somewhere along the way, the Navy started making changes. A different combat system here, modified power plant there, new weapons requirements, American steel specifications, crew habitability upgrades—the list grew. Before anyone really noticed, commonality with the parent design had plummeted below 15%.
Suddenly, the Navy wasn’t adapting a proven ship. It was designing a brand-new one from scratch, just with a familiar hull shape. And brand-new designs are expensive. And slow.
The alterations turned what should have been a relatively straightforward derivative into essentially a clean-sheet design with all the risks that entails.
The Three-Year Delay Nobody Saw Coming
The lead ship—future USS Constellation—was originally supposed to deliver in 2026. Reasonable, right? Especially for a modified foreign design.
Then reality set in. Supply chain issues, workforce shortages, design changes, integration problems with American combat systems… pick your poison. By early this year, even optimistic projections had slipped to 2029. That’s a three-year delay on the very first ship, before the yard has even worked the kinks out of serial production.
In shipbuilding, the first ship is always the hardest. If number one is already three years late, what does that say about ships ten through twenty?
Sticker Shock on Steroids
Cost growth has been brutal. Early estimates pegged each frigate at around $850 million. Perfectly reasonable for a ship carrying 32 missile cells plus additional anti-ship weapons.
But as the design diverged and delays mounted, those numbers started climbing fast. Recent projections were pushing well past $1.2 billion per hull—and that was before the latest rounds of inflation and labor issues.
At that price point, you’re starting to approach Arleigh Burke territory. And the Burke carries three times as many missiles, has proven survivability, and benefits from decades of continuous production learning curve.
- Constellation: ~32-48 missile cells, questionable survivability, brand-new design
- Arleigh Burke Flight III: 96 missile cells, combat-proven, mature production line
- Price difference: shrinking fast
When your “cheap” frigate starts costing almost as much as your gold-standard destroyer, the value proposition collapses.
The China Factor Nobody Can Ignore
Perhaps the most sobering backdrop to all of this is what’s happening across the Pacific.
While the US Navy has been wrestling with one troubled ship class after another, China has been building warships at a pace that would make World War II America blush. Their shipyards are launching modern destroyers and frigates at a rate of roughly one every few months.
The numbers tell a grim story:
| Year | US Battle Force Ships | Chinese Navy Ships | |
| 2020 | ~296 | ~350 | |
| 2025 (projected) | ~290-300 | ~395 | |
| 2030 (projected) | ~310-330? | ~440+ |
China isn’t just building more ships—they’re building bigger, more capable ones. Their Type 055 cruisers are arguably the most powerful surface combatants afloat after the US Navy’s own Ticonderoga-class replacements (which don’t exist yet).
In this environment, delivering twenty smallish frigates starting in the 2030s suddenly looks less like a solution and more like bringing a knife to a gunfight.
Ghosts of Shipbuilding Failures Past
If this all sounds familiar, that’s because it is. The Navy has been here before. Multiple times, actually.
Remember the Zumwalt-class destroyers? Originally planned as 32 revolutionary stealth ships that would transform naval warfare. Ended up with exactly three hulls after costs tripled and the revolutionary gun system was canceled. Those three ships now serve primarily as very expensive technology demonstrators.
Or how about the Littoral Combat Ship program? Two different designs, dozens of ships built, and now many are being retired after less than a decade of service because they’re fragile, under-armed, and can’t survive real combat.
The Constellation was supposed to be different. It was supposed to be the program that finally got small surface combatants right.
Instead, it’s joining a rather ignominious club of Navy programs that promised the moon and delivered disappointment.
What Happens Now?
The Navy insists the first two ships will still be completed, though even that is “under review.” The service has reached agreement to cancel the four follow-on ships that were contracted but not yet under construction.
The shipbuilder says they’re already in talks about new work—possibly unmanned vessels or other programs. The Wisconsin and Michigan workforce that was counting on decades of steady frigate work will need something to replace it, and fast.
But the bigger question is strategic. With the frigate program dead or dying, what’s the plan to actually grow the fleet?
The Navy still says it needs 355 ships, ideally closer to 500 with unmanned vessels. But current projections show the fleet shrinking before it grows, possibly dipping into the 280s before new construction can reverse the trend.
Several alternatives are being floated:
- Buying more Arleigh Burke destroyers (expensive but proven)
- Restarting Flight I/II Burkes to keep production lines hot
- Accelerated development of the DDG(X) next-generation destroyer
- Greater emphasis on unmanned surface vessels
- Possibly foreign designs (again) but with stricter limits on Americanization
Each option has serious drawbacks. More Burkes mean continuing to build 1970s-era hull designs well into the 2040s. Unmanned vessels sound great until you remember they’re largely unproven in combat. Foreign designs bring us right back to the Constellation problem.
In my view—and I’ve been watching Navy procurement debacles for longer than I care to admit—the real issue isn’t any particular ship class. It’s a broken requirements process that can’t stop moving the goalposts, combined with industrial base problems that make every new start excruciatingly difficult.
Until those fundamental issues are fixed, we’re going to keep having this conversation. Every few years another program will stumble, costs will balloon, schedules will slip, and eventually someone will make the painful decision to cancel.
Meanwhile, Chinese shipyards keep welding.
The cancellation of the Constellation program isn’t just about one ship class. It’s a symptom of deeper, systemic problems in American naval shipbuilding. And unless those problems are addressed with the urgency they deserve, the fleet size gap will only continue to grow.
The Navy made what was probably the least-bad decision available under the circumstances. But make no mistake—this is not a success story. It’s a necessary retreat that highlights just how far the service has fallen behind in the great power competition at sea.
And the clock is ticking.
