Imagine a military strategy hyped as revolutionary, only to crumble under the weight of its own ambition. That’s the story of the Marine Corps’ Force Design, a concept that promised to redefine warfare but has instead left many scratching their heads. Introduced in 2019, it was sold as a bold leap into the future, leveraging cutting-edge tech to counter threats like China’s growing naval power. But as someone who’s followed military strategy for years, I can’t help but wonder: did the Corps bet on the wrong horse?
The Rise and Fall of Force Design
When the Marine Corps unveiled Force Design, it was hailed as a game-changer. The plan aimed to position small, agile units on scattered islands in the South China Sea, armed with missiles to disrupt Chinese naval operations. It sounded innovative—almost cinematic. But beneath the glossy press releases, cracks were already forming. The strategy’s reliance on specific technologies and untested assumptions has proven to be its Achilles’ heel.
A Logistical Nightmare
Logistics is the backbone of any military operation, yet Force Design seems to have overlooked this critical element. The idea of dispersing small units across remote islands to launch anti-ship missiles sounds clever until you consider the practicalities. How do you supply these units? Food, fuel, and ammunition don’t magically appear on coral reefs. The envisioned Landing Ship Medium (LSM) was meant to solve this, but here’s the kicker: not a single LSM keel has been laid. These ships are also criticized for being too slow and costly, making them sitting ducks in a fast-moving conflict.
Logistics wins wars, but poor planning loses them.
– Military strategist
Beyond the LSM debacle, the strategy assumes access to sovereign territories like the Philippines, which has explicitly stated it won’t allow certain missile systems in a Taiwan conflict. Without guaranteed basing, Force Design’s foundation crumbles. It’s like planning a party but forgetting to secure the venue.
Obsolete Before Deployment
The tech at the heart of Force Design hasn’t fared much better. The Corps invested heavily in NEMSIS anti-ship missiles, but these subsonic weapons are already outdated. China’s countermeasures, like advanced radar and electronic warfare, can neutralize them before they even reach their targets. Meanwhile, the Tomahawk missiles initially considered were deemed logistically impractical. It’s a classic case of betting on yesterday’s tech for tomorrow’s fight.
- NEMSIS missiles: Slow, vulnerable, and increasingly obsolete.
- Tomahawk missiles: Too heavy for small-unit deployment.
- Island basing: Reliant on foreign permission, often denied.
This isn’t just a minor oversight. The rapid pace of technological advancement means that strategies banking on specific systems can become irrelevant overnight. Force Design’s rigid framework didn’t account for this, leaving the Corps with a plan that’s more museum piece than modern warfare.
A Missed Opportunity: OMFTS
Before Force Design stole the spotlight, the Marine Corps was exploring a far more promising concept: Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). Developed in the 1990s, OMFTS envisioned launching amphibious assaults from over the horizon, using small, mobile units to disrupt enemy defenses from unexpected angles. Think of it as a surgical strike compared to Force Design’s blunt hammer.
I’ve always been fascinated by OMFTS’s flexibility. Instead of relying on predictable beach landings, it used assets like the V-22 Osprey and CH-53E helicopters to hit unconventional entry points—think boat ramps or small inlets. These forces could then move inland, sowing chaos and opening larger landing zones for follow-on troops. It was dynamic, adaptable, and, frankly, pretty darn clever.
Why OMFTS Still Makes Sense
Unlike Force Design, OMFTS was battle-tested in simulations. In the late 1990s, war games conducted with advanced tech assumptions—think Chinese drones and hypersonic missiles—showed that OMFTS could counter sophisticated threats. The key? A Reconnaissance-Surveillance-Target Acquisition (RSTA) Cloud. This system used swarms of micro-sensors to track enemy movements in real-time, allowing U.S. forces to strike mobile launchers and disrupt command structures.
Adaptability is the cornerstone of modern warfare.
– Defense analyst
These sensors, developed with input from DARPA, were envisioned as cheap, scalable, and deployable by 2020. They could be dropped at key choke points—roads, bridges, you name it—to expose gaps in enemy defenses. Compare that to Force Design’s static missile batteries, which are easy targets for a savvy adversary like China.
| Strategy | Core Strength | Main Weakness |
| Force Design | Missile-based interdiction | Logistical infeasibility |
| OMFTS | Flexible amphibious operations | Requires advanced tech integration |
The beauty of OMFTS lies in its affordability and adaptability. Assets like the V-22 and Navy LCACs are already in the Corps’ inventory, and micro-sensors would be far cheaper than the radar and missile systems Force Design demands. Why fix what isn’t broken?
The Cost of Stubbornness
Perhaps the most frustrating part of this saga is the Marine Corps’ refusal to pivot. Leadership has doubled down on Force Design, even as its flaws become glaringly obvious. To fund this vision, the Corps divested itself of proven capabilities—tanks, artillery, you name it—sacrificing its role as a global crisis response force. It’s like selling your car to buy a unicycle, only to realize the unicycle’s wheels are square.
In my view, this top-down approach stifles innovation. Force Design was pushed through without open debate or rigorous war-gaming, much like the French Maginot Line in the 1930s. That fortress was a marvel of engineering—until the Germans simply went around it. Similarly, China’s dynamic Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems could render Force Design’s static units irrelevant.
Lessons from History
History loves repeating itself, doesn’t it? The French ignored warnings about their Maginot Line, assuming it was impregnable. The Marine Corps seems to be making the same mistake, clinging to a strategy that’s already showing its age. The good news? Force Design’s delays mean there’s still time to course-correct.
- Reassess Force Design’s core assumptions.
- Revive and update OMFTS with modern tech.
- Prioritize logistics and flexibility over static systems.
By shifting focus to OMFTS, the Corps could regain its edge as a versatile, global force. The tools are there—V-22s, LCACs, and emerging sensor tech. All it takes is leadership willing to admit a misstep and embrace a proven alternative.
What’s Next for the Corps?
The Indo-Pacific theater is evolving fast, and so must the Marine Corps. China’s Reconnaissance-Strike Complex—a mix of drones, satellites, and mobile launchers—poses a real threat. But it’s not invincible. War games from the 1990s showed that disrupting this system is possible with the right tools, like the RSTA Cloud. The Corps just needs to dust off those old playbooks and modernize them.
In my experience, the best strategies evolve through debate and testing, not rigid mandates. Force Design’s top-down approach ignored this, but it’s not too late to pivot. New leadership could steer the Corps back to its roots as a nimble, expeditionary force, ready for anything from Taiwan to the Middle East.
The best plans adapt to the enemy’s moves, not the other way around.
– Retired Marine officer
The Marine Corps has a chance to reclaim its title as the world’s premier crisis response force. By reviving OMFTS and investing in affordable, flexible tech, it can prepare for the conflicts of 2030 and beyond. Force Design, for all its hype, is a cautionary tale of what happens when ambition outpaces reality.
So, what’s the takeaway? Military strategy isn’t about chasing shiny new toys—it’s about building systems that work under pressure. Force Design missed that mark, but the Corps has the tools and talent to bounce back. The question is: will it seize the opportunity, or double down on a sinking ship?
